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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DAVID PETERSON, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 930132-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992). 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 1988) is set forth in 
Addendum A.1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the evidence adduced adequately supports the 
trial court's findings that Mr. Peterson violated the terms of his 
probation? 
Standard of review -- Abuse of discretion. 
The decision to grant, modify, or revoke probation is in 
the discretion of the trial court. Therefore, in order 
to succeed in this claim, defendant must show that the 
evidence of a probation violation, viewed in a light most 
favorable to the trial court's findings, is so deficient 
that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking 
defendant's probation. 
Amendments since 1988 have been primarily technical, and do 
not impact the merits of this appeal. 
State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1990) . The State has the 
burden of proving a probation violation by a preponderance of the 
evidence. State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, 278 (Utah App. 1990) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On August 3, 1988, Mr. Peterson was convicted at jury 
trial of theft, a 2nd degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-4-404, for failing to return a motor vehicle taken on a "test 
drive" on November 18, 1987. R. 14, 85. Judge Moffat ordered a 
ninety day diagnostic evaluation (R. 91, 93, 97), which was not 
completed (R. 105). On Mr. Peterson's motion (R. 105), he was 
sentenced on November 4, 1988 to one to fifteen years, stayed 
pending completion of probation, whose terms included one year in 
jail (credit for time served), a $1500 fine (plus surcharge), 
restitution of $53 00, a mental health evaluation (with follow-up 
treatment as indicated) and 18 months probation upon completion of 
the jail term. R. 106-7. Mr. Peterson was released by order dated 
November 30, 1988. 
As a result of a probation violation, on April 13, 1990 
Judge Moffat revoked probation, reinstated 18 months probation, and 
ordered 30 days in jail. R. 123. As a result of an additional 
probation violation, on August 23, 1991 Judge Moffat revoked 
probation, reinstated 18 months probation, and ordered 60 days of 
electronic supervision. R. 133. 
On September 9, 1992, Probation Officer Dale Hansen swore 
out an affidavit in support of an order to show cause why probation 
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should not be revoked. R. 135-6. A Progress/Violation Report was 
also filed with the court. R. 137. A hearing was scheduled for 
September 25, 1992. Mr. Peterson was not informed of the hearing, 
and failed to appear. A bench warrant (R. 13 9) was issued. R. 
140. 
Mr. Peterson was arrested on November 4, 1992, see R. 
143, and posted bail, see R. 144. At hearing November 13, 1992, 
Mr. Peterson denied all allegations of the order to show cause. 
Mr. Peterson indicated a desire to retain his own counsel, and the 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association ("LDA") was permitted to 
withdraw. Hearing was scheduled for December 11, 1992. R. 145. 
LDA was re-appointed. R. 147. An evidentiary hearing 
was scheduled for January 26, 1993. R. 148. Mr. Peterson failed 
to appear. Mr. Peterson was located, and the evidentiary hearing 
was held on January 29, 1993. R. 152. See Transcript, R. 174.2 
Judge Moffat found Mr. Peterson in violation of his probation, 
revoked probation, ordered one year in jail (no credit for time 
served) ,3 and ordered that restitution be converted to a civil 
judgment. R. 152 (minute entry). This appeal ensued. Judge 
Moffat filed a Probation Revocation Order and Sentence on March 23, 
1993. R. 166-7. An amended notice of appeal was filed. R. 172-3. 
2For some unknown reason, this transcript was sealed. It is 
therefore not separately numbered. 
3Mr. Peterson elected to serve his one year term at the prison 
rather than the jail, and the court acquiesced. R. 36, 38. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Probation Officer Dale Hansen's Affidavit in Support of 
Order to Show Cause charges Mr. Peterson with violating the terms 
of his probation, as follows: 
1. By failing to maintain full-time employment and 
provide check stubs to verify employment, which is 
in violation of Condition Number 11 [sic - should 
be 10] of the defendant's Probation Agreement. 
2. By failing to make regular payments toward his fine 
and surcharge of $1875.00, which is violation of 
Condition Number 11.A of the defendant's Probation 
Agreement. 
3. By failing to pay $5,300.00 in restitution and make 
regular payments, which is in violation of 
Condition Number 11.A of the defendant's Probation 
Agreement. 
4. By failing to complete mental health treatment, 
which is in violation of Condition Number 11.B of 
the defendant's Probation Agreement. 
R. 135-6. 
At the hearing on the order to show cause, Mr. Peterson's 
probation officer, Mr. Dale Hansen, testified to the following: 
1. Mr. Peterson failed to provide proof of verifiable 
employment, and substantiate employment by providing copies of pay 
stubs. R. 174:6-7. 
2. Mr. Peterson had failed to make any payments towards 
his fine. However, Officer Hansen did admit that it is normal to 
pay restitution first, and then start making payments on the fine. 
R. 174:7. 
3. Mr. Peterson had made sporadic payments totalling 
$1,290 on his restitution obligation of $5,300. R. 174:7. On 
cross examination, Officer Hansen indicated that since August of 
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1992 he had received two payments ($10 and $150) on Mr. Peterson's 
restitution obligation. R. 174:9. 
4. Officer Hansen had nothing in his file indicating 
completion of a mental health evaluation, and any follow-up 
treatment indicated. R. 174:7-8. 
David Peterson testified to the following: 
1. a. Mr. Peterson worked for LSI (Labor Services 
Inc.) doing temporary work from August of 1992 through 
November, 1992. Exhibit 3, introduced at the hearing, 
includes pay stubs from LSI. R. 174:10-13. 
b. Mr. Peterson worked for approximately 2M weeks 
in Flagstaff, Arizona just prior to Thanksgiving of 1992. The 
second page of Exhibit 3 is a pay stub from this job. R. 
174:11-12. 
c. Exhibit 5 is a pay stub from SOS Temporary 
Service. Mr. Peterson had been employed by them since January 
1, 1993, and had received a total of $525.88. R. 174:13. 
d. Exhibit 2 is a profit loss statement from Mr. 
Peterson's tax accountant, indicating a $3,000 loss from Mr. 
Peterson's business as an independent representative of 
different art lines. This business started in August of 1991 
and operated until sometime after August of 1992. As a result 
of the recession, the business went under. R. 174:14-15. 
e. After his business folded, Mr. Peterson 
received training in and acquired his Commercial Driver's 
License. R. 174:14. This cost about $1,000. Mr. Peterson 
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applied to numerous employers, but was only able to obtain 
temporary work. R. 174:24-5. 
f. Other than as indicated above, Mr. Peterson had 
no other employment. R. 174:15-16. Mr. Peterson was 
incarcerated for eight or nine months while on probation, and 
had no income during those periods. R. 174:24. 
g. Mr. Peterson indicated that he had no income in 
1988, under $5,000 in each of 1989 and 1990, and gross income 
of $10,000 in 1991, with a loss of $3,000. R. 174:22-3. 
2. Mr. Peterson did not contest that nothing had been 
paid on his fine, as all payments first go to restitution. 
3. Mr. Peterson testified that he did the best he could 
towards paying restitution. R. 174:14, 34. He had other debts, R. 
174:14, and had to pay $600 for electronic supervision. R. 174:20. 
In part due to his criminal record, Mr. Peterson experienced 
difficulty finding employment. R. 174:24-5. 
4. Mr. Peterson completed his mental health evaluation 
right after he was released in 1988. Exhibit 4 is a release 
executed by Mr. Peterson authorizing Valley Mental Health to 
release records concerning Mr. Peterson's evaluation. Probation 
Officer Sherry Morgan "must have received the report because she 
sent a--a notification that [Mr. Peterson needed to pay for that." 
When Judge Moffat indicated at a prior hearing that he did not have 
the report, Mr. Peterson immediately asked Valley Mental Health to 
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provide the court with a copy.4 Mr. Peterson did not have a copy 
of the report. R. 174:16-19. 
After argument by counsel, R. 174:28-9, and argument by 
AP&P, R. 174:30-32, the court ruled as follows: 
THE COURT: Yeah. Well, first of all, the 
Court finds the defendant in violation of his probation 
and revokes probation. 
Secondly, I don't know whether he thinks that 
we all fell off a turnip truck yesterday or not, but he's 
not as smart as he thinks he is. 
He's played this game from before the case was 
tried. He has horsed this Court around, he has stalled 
and delayed and said, ["]oh, I'm such a good boy,["] on 
the one hand, and done everything possible on the other, 
to go about living his life as though he never committed 
this crime and as though the world were just his little 
cup of tulips. 
I am, frankly, tired of it. I'm tired of him, 
I'm tired of his attitude. His attitude is definitely 
bad news. 
My reaction is to send him out to the Point of 
the Mountain, but barring that, I will follow the 
recommendations of Mr. Hansen. I will sentence him to 
one year in the Salt Lake County Jail, commencing today, 
forthwith, no time for credit served--no credit for time 
served. End of that, his restitution will be converted 
to a civil judgment and the matter will be at an end. 
R. 174:32-3. After being prompted by defense counsel to make 
specific findings, the court continued:5 
THE COURT: One, full-time employment doesn't 
mean going out and starting your own business where 
you're the boss. The reason you get full-time employment 
for people who have completed felonies is because they 
can't run their own lives. And he had no authority from 
anybody to do that. 
4During the hearing, the court's clerk indicated that a copy 
of the report arrived a couple months prior. R. 21. This report 
was received into evidence, R. 27-8, and is included in the manila 
envelope with the hearing exhibits. 
5There are no written findings in this case, but under State 
v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, 273-4 (Utah App. 1990) none are required. 
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Secondly, even if he had, he did not continue 
with full-time employment and hasn't had full-time 
employment at all during this whole--the whole situation. 
He's worked off and on and done what he's wanted to do. 
There's no doubt about the fact that he has not 
paid toward his fine on any kind of a regular basis and 
he hasn't attempted to. And the same thing is true of 
restitution. 
I will dismiss Count 4, the mental health 
requirement. I think he completed that. 
He hasn't provided the check stubs to verify 
employment. 
R. 174:33-34. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The evidence adduced by the State fails to show a willful 
failure to pay restitution and obtain full-time employment. 
Submittal of check stubs is not required by the conditions of Mr. 
Peterson's probation. Uncharged conduct cannot be the basis for 
probation revocation. Mr. Peterson should be released, and his 
probation reinstated. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED FAILS TO SHOW 
THAT MR. PETERSON WILLFULLY FAILED TO 
FIND FULL-TIME EMPLOYMENT, AND WILLFULLY 
FAILED TO PAY RESTITUTION. 
The State must prove probation violations by a 
preponderance of the evidence. State v. Hodges, 798 P. 2d 270, 278 
(Utah App. 1990). A finding of willfulness is required to justify 
probation revocation for failure to comply with court ordered 
payments. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 76 
L.Ed.2d 221 (1983); State v. Archuleta, 812 P.2d 80, 84 (Utah App. 
1991) ("If the probationer failed to make sufficient bona fide 
8 
efforts to legally acquire the resources to pay, the court may 
properly revoke probation.") ; see also Hodges, 798 P.2d at 277 ("in 
order to revoke probation for the violation of a condition of 
probation not involving the payment of money, the violation must be 
willful or, if not willful, must presently threaten the safety of 
society"); State v. Ruesga, 211 Utah Adv. Rep. 48, 49 (Utah App. 
1993) (same). 
In this case, there is insufficient evidence to show that 
Mr. Peterson's failure to pay his fine and restitution more rapidly 
was willful. To the contrary, Mr. Peterson testified that he did 
the best he could: 
With the recession--when I first got in the business, it 
was doing very well, at which time, I was also on ESS, [6] 
that's when I was released out of jail. I paid off the 
ESS in full with money that I had--that I had earned 
starting this company. It was going okay for awhile, 
then with the recession and everything, art sales seems 
to be a luxury item, the sales dropped off. At that 
time, I went and had training and acquired my CDL, which 
is a commercial driver's license, and that was quite 
costly due to the fact of the new law that went in effect 
last year, so I was working two to three jobs just keep 
above ground at this time. 
That's one of the reasons why my payments were 
sporadic, because I also had other collectors that were 
trying to get money out of me at the same time, and I was 
doing the best I could. 
R. 174:14. 
I have worked very hard to satisfy the Court, 
even though you don't see it that way. I figure, ESS, I 
worked very hard at that. I--I--I was putting in over 60 
hours a week in my art sales to make things happen. I 
was--Sherry Morgan was fully aware that I was putting in 
the effort there and I was also putting it down on my 
report. She did not bring anything to my attention, 
saying this is not acceptable, that--that--you know--
6Electronic Supervision Services. See R. 134. 
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R. 174:34. 
The State put on no evidence whatsoever that indicated 
how Mr. Peterson could have obtained better, more steady 
employment. Cf. State v. Barlow, No. 920381-CA, slip op. at 6 
(Utah App. April 8, 1993) (criminal nonsupport case; Orme, J., 
dissenting): 
As to the element that non-payment was "without just 
cause," the State proved nothing at all. The State did 
not show that defendant had income during the charging 
period in an amount equal to or exceeding the unpaid 
support nor did it show he had assets which, if 
liquidated, would have provided funds with which to pay 
the support. It did not prove that defendant enjoyed a 
lifestyle that of necessity meant he had the means to pay 
the unpaid support. On the contrary, he was evicted from 
his residence for non-payment of rent. The State proved 
he had skills in various aspects of the automobile 
business; it did not prove that positions of that sort 
were available in the community, much less what such 
positions pay. The State proved that he was a de facto 
partner in an auto body shop but it did not show he made 
any money for his effort. On the contrary, the business 
folded. 
In this case, Mr. Peterson was involved in a business 
that folded. Thereafter, he spent approximately one thousand 
dollars getting trained for a commercial driver's license, and 
diligently pursued employment in that field. R. 174:14, 24-5, Mr. 
Peterson made the bona fide effort that the law demands of him. 
The State adduced no evidence to the contrary. The trial court's 
finding that Mr. Peterson violated the terms of his probation 
cannot stand on this basis, because there is no showing of 
willfulness. 
The trial court commented negatively on Mr. Peterson's 
failed attempt at self employment. R. 174:33. As Mr. Peterson 
10 
explained, Mr. Peterson undertook this employment with the full 
knowledge and consent of his probation officer, Sherry Morgan. R. 
174:34. This is not an appropriate basis for finding a probation 
violation. 
The only additional finding the court made, other than 
employment and payment compliance findings, was that Mr. Peterson 
failed to submit pay stubs to his probation officer. R. 174:34, 
35. Mr. Peterson testified that he provided all the necessary 
information on his monthly reports. R. 174:10, 11. Significantly, 
AP&P did not submit Mr. Peterson's monthly reports to show that 
this information was in fact incomplete. Nowhere in Mr. Peterson's 
probation agreement (Exhibit 1 at the hearing) does it state that 
Mr. Peterson must provide check stubs to AP&P. In addition to 
failing to prove this particular conduct, it does not appear that 
this conduct can even be the basis for probation revocation, as it 
is not a condition of his probation. Probation condition number 10 
states "I shall seek, obtain and maintain verifiable, lawful 
employment and/or education." See Exhibit 1. There is no mention 
of check stubs. 
Finally, the State adduced evidence concerning an alleged 
instance where Mr. Peterson went to Arizona without authority. R. 
174:20-22. The State further introduced argument7 that Mr. 
Peterson may not have kept his address current. R. 174:31. This 
7Mr. Peterson was given no opportunity to cross examine Mr. 
Hansen on this point. Absent confrontation, this evidence cannot 
support probation revocation. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Utah 
Const, art. I, section 12. 
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evidence and argument cannot support probation revocation in this 
case because it was not charged in the show cause order. In State 
v. Cowdell, 626 P.2d 487, 489 (Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
The ground relied on . . . was not mentioned in 
the order to show cause. This was a clear violation of 
even the limited procedural rights afforded a probationer 
in protecting his restricted, though nonetheless 
valuable, right to personal liberty. Lack of notice of 
the reason for which a person might be deprived of 
liberty completely denies that person the right to 
prepare a defense and effectively destroys the value of 
any defense that is available. 
The additional misconduct alluded to by the State could only form 
the basis for probation revocation if it was properly charged. 
Because it was not properly charged, this information is irrelevant 
to the instant inquiry. 
CONCLUSION 
The State failed to prove a willful probation violation 
with respect to employment and non-payment of restitution. Non-
submittal of check stubs was likewise not proven, and further does 
not appear to be a probation condition. Other conduct alluded to 
by the State was not properly charged. Mr. Peterson should be 
released from prison, and his probation reinstated.8 
8The term of probation at issue here started on August 23, 
1991. R. 133. Absent a properly charged and proven violation, his 
probation ended February 23, 1993. If Mr. Peterson wins this 
appeal, his probation has been satisfied. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Jll±t day of July, 1993 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, Robert K. Heineman, hereby certify that I have caused 
eight copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84102, and four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this Jt^tL day of July, 
1993. 
Robert K. Heineman 
DELIVERED/MAILED this day of July, 1993 
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ADDENDUM A 
77-18-1 CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
to revoke the probation. Any time served in confinement awaiting a hear-
ing or decision concerning revocation of probation does not constitute 
service of time toward the total probation term unless the probationer is 
exonerated at the hearing. 
(b) When any probationer, without authority from the court or the 
Department of Corrections, absents himself from the state, or avoids or 
evades probation supervision, the period of absence, avoidance, or evasion 
tolls the probation period. 
(c) Nothing in this section precludes the court from discharging a pro-
bationer at any time, at the discretion of the court. 
(9) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (7)(c) of this chapter [section], pro-
bation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a hearing 
by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the 
probationer has violated the conditions of probation. Probation may not 
be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a finding that the condi-
tions of probation have been violated. 
(b) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts as-
serted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court 
which authorized probation shall determine whether the affidavit estab-
lishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or exten-
sion of probation is justified. If the court determines that there is probable 
cause, it shall cause to be served on the defendant a copy of the affidavit 
and an order to show cause why his probation should not be revoked, 
modified, or extended. 
(c) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the hear-
ing, and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the 
hearing. The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. The 
order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be repre-
sented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed for hi-m if 
he is indigent. The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to 
present evidence. 
(d) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of 
the affidavit. If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the 
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations. The per-
sons who have given adverse information on which the allegations are 
based shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning by the defen-
dant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders. The defendant may 
call witnesses, appear and speak in his own behalf, and present evidence. 
(e) After hearing, the court shall make findings of fact. Upon a finding 
that the defendant violated the condition* of probation, the court may 
order the probation revoked, modified, [or] continued, or that the entire 
probation term commence anew. If probation is revoked, the defendant 
shall be sentenced or the sentence previously imposed shall be executed. 
(10) Restitution imposed under this chapter is considered a debt for "willful 
and malicious injury" for purposes of exceptions listed to discharge in bank-
ruptcy as provided in Title 11, Section 523, U.S.C.A. 1985. 
History: C. 1953, 77-18-1, enacted by L. 212, § 17; 1985, ch. 229, § 1; 1987, ch. 114, 
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1981, ch. 59, § 2; 1982, ch. § 1. 
9, 9 1; 1983, ch. 47, § 1; 1983, ch. 68, § 1; Compiler's Notes. — The 1983 amendment 
1983, ch. 85, § 2; 1984, ch. 20, § 1; 1985, ch. by Chapter 47 made the former second and 
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77-18-1 CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
CHAPTER 18 
THE JUDGMENT 
Section Section 
77-18-1. Suspension of sentence — Proba- 77-18-3. Disposition of fines. 
tion — Supervision — Presen- 77-18-5.5. Judgment of death — Defendant 
tence investigation — Confi- to select method — Time of se-
dential — Terms — Restitution lection. 
— Extension or revocation — 77-18-6. Judgment to pay fine or restitu-
Hearings. tion constitutes a lien. 
77-18-2. Expungement and sealing of 
records. 
77-18-1. Suspension of sentence — Probation — Supervi-
sion — Presentence investigation — Confidential1 
— Terms — Restitution — Extension or revoca-
tion — Hearings. 
(1) (a) On a plea of guilty or no contest or conviction of any crime or of-
fense, the court may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and 
place the defendant on probation. Supervised probation by the depart-
ment may not be imposed by the court in cases of class C misdemeanors or 
infractions. The jurisdiction of all probationers referred to the Depart-
ment of Corrections is vested in the court having jurisdiction; custody is 
with the Department of Corrections. 
(b) The legal custody of all probationers not referred to the department 
is vested as ordered by the court having jurisdiction of the defendant. The 
court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(2) (a) The Department of Corrections shall establish supervision and pre-
sentence investigation standards for all individuals referred to the de-
partment. These standards shall be based on the type of offense, the 
demand for services, the availability of agency resources, and other crite-
ria established by the Department of Corrections to determine what level 
of services shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submit-
ted to the Judicial Council and Board of Pardons for review and comment 
prior to adoption by the Department of Corrections. 
(3) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the Department of Corrections 
is not required to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C 
misdemeanors or infractions, or to conduct presentence investigation reports 
on class C misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may super-
vise the probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department 
standards. 
(4) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the concur-
rence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a 
reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence investiga-
tion report from the Department of Corrections or information from other 
sources about the defendant. The presentence investigation report shall in-
clude a specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recom-
mendation from the Department of Corrections regarding the payment of 
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restitution by the defendant. The contents of the report are confidential and 
not available except for purposes of sentencing as provided by rule of the 
Judicial Council and for use by the Department of Corrections. At the time of 
sentence, the court shall hear any testimony or information the defendant or 
the prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the appropriate sen-
tence. This testimony or information shall be presented in open court on 
record and in the presence of the defendant, 
(5) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the defendant may 
be required to perform any or all of the following: 
(a) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being 
placed on probation; 
(b) pay amounts required under Chapter 32a, Title 77, Defense Costs; 
(c) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally 
liable; 
(d) participate in available treatment programs; 
(e) serve a period of time in the county jail not to exceed one year; 
(f) serve a term of home confinement; 
(g) participate in community service restitution programs; 
(h) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services; 
and 
(i) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims in accordance 
with Subsections 76-3-201 (3) and (4). 
(6) The Department of Corrections is responsible for the collection of fines 
and restitution during the probation period in cases where the court orders 
supervised probation by the department. The prosecutor shall provide notice 
of the restitution order to the clerk of the court. The clerk shall place the order 
on the civil docket and shall provide notice of the order to the parties. The 
order is considered a legal judgment under which the victim may seek civil 
remedy. 
(7) (a) Upon completion without violation of 18 months' probation in felony 
or class A misdemeanor cases, or six months in class B misdemeanor 
cases, the probation period shall be terminated, unless earlier terminated 
by the court. 
(b) The Department of Corrections shall notify the sentencing court 
and prosecuting attorney in writing 45 days in advance in all cases where 
termination of supervision will occur by law. The notification shall in-
clude a probation progress report and complete report of details on out-
standing fines and restitution orders. 
(c) At any time prior to the termination of probation, upon a TnniiTniiin 
of five days' notice and a hearing or upon a waiver of the notice and 
hearing by the probationer, the court may extend probation for an addi-
tional term of 18 months in felony or class A misdemeanors or six months 
in class B misdemeanors if fines or restitution or both are owing. 
(8) (a) All time served without violation while on probation applies to ser-
vice of the total term of probation but does not eliminate the requirement 
of serving 18 consecutive months without violation in felony or class A 
misdemeanor cases, or six consecutive months without violation in class 
B misdemeanor cases. Any time served by a probationer outside of con-
finement after having been charged with a probation violation and prior 
to a hearing to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward 
the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing 
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